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Abstract  14 
Nipah virus (NiV) causes a severe and often fatal neurological disease in humans. Whilst fruit 15 
bats are considered the natural reservoir, NiV also infects pigs and may cause an unapparent or 16 
mild disease. Direct pig-to-human transmission was responsible for the first and still most 17 
devastating NiV outbreaks in Malaysia and Singapore in 1998-99, with nearly 300 human cases 18 
and over 100 fatalities. Pigs can therefore play a key role in the epidemiology of NiV by acting 19 
as an ‘amplifying’ host. The outbreak in Singapore ended with the prohibition of pig imports 20 
from Malaysia and the Malaysian outbreak was ended by culling 45% of the country’s pig 21 
population with costs exceeding US$500 million. Despite the importance of NiV as an 22 
emerging disease with the potential for pandemic, no vaccines or therapeutics are currently 23 
approved for human or livestock use. In this mini-review, we will discuss current knowledge 24 
of NiV infection in pigs; our ongoing work to develop a NiV vaccine for use in pigs; and the 25 
pig as a model to support human vaccine development.  26 
 27 
 28 
 29 
 30 
Nipah virus is an emerging pathogen with the potential for pandemic 31 
Nipah virus (NiV) is an enveloped, single stranded, negative sense RNA paramyxovirus, genus 32 
Henipavirus. The natural hosts and wildlife reservoirs of NiV are Old World fruit bats of the 33 
genus Pteropus (Halpin et al., 2011). Both Nipah and the related Hendra virus possess a number 34 
of features that distinguish them from other paramyxoviruses. Of particular note is their broad 35 
host range which is facilitated by the use of the evolutionary conserved ephrin-B2 and –B3 as 36 
cellular receptors (Bossart et al., 2008). The NiV attachment glycoprotein (G) is responsible 37 
for binding to ephrin-B2/-B3 (Bowden et al., 2008). Following receptor binding, the G protein 38 
dissociates from the fusion (F) protein. Subsequently, the F protein undergoes a series of 39 
conformational changes which in turn initiates fusion of the viral and host membrane allowing 40 
entry (Liu et al., 2013). After fusion, the F protein is synthesised and cleaved into fusion active 41 
F1 and F2 subunits. These subunits are subsequently transported back to the cell surface to be 42 
incorporated into budding virions, or facilitate fusion between infected and adjacent uninfected 43 
cells (Maisner et al., 2009). This cell-to-cell fusion results in the formation of multinucleated 44 
cells called syncytia, and greatly influences the cyopathogenicity of NiV as it allows spread of 45 
the virus, even in the absence of viral budding (Diederich et al., 2008; Maisner et al., 2009).  46 
NiV infection is currently classed as a stage III zoonotic disease, meaning it can spill over to 47 
humans and cause limited outbreaks of person-to-person transmission (Wolfe et al., 2007; 48 
Luby, 2013). NiV outbreaks have been recognised yearly in Bangladesh since 2001 as well as 49 
occasional outbreaks in neighbouring India (Fig. 1). These outbreaks have been characterised 50 
by person-to-person transmission and the death of over 70% of infected people (Hsu et al., 51 
2004; Donaldson and Lucey, 2018). In May 2018, the first ever outbreak in southern India was 52 
reported. A total of 19 NiV cases, of which 17 resulted in death, were reported in the state of 53 
Kerala. Pteropus giganteus bats from areas around the index case in Kozhikode, Kerala, were 54 
tested at the National High Security Animal Diseases Laboratory at Bhopal. Of these, 19% 55 
were found to be NiV positive by RT-PCR (WHO, 2018a). Characteristics of NiV that increase 56 
the risk of it becoming a global pandemic include: humans are already susceptible; many NiV 57 
strains are capable of person-to-person transmission; and as an RNA virus, NiV has a high 58 
mutation rate (Kulkarni et al., 2009). NiV has been found to survive for up to 4 days when 59 
subjected to various environmental conditions, including fruit bat urine and mango flesh 60 
(Fogarty et al., 2008). Whilst survival time was influenced by fluctuations in both temperature 61 
and pH, the ability for NiV to be spread by fomites could play a role in outbreak situations.  62 
The first and still most devastating NiV outbreak occurred in peninsular Malaysia from 63 
September 1998 to May 1999 (Paton et al., 1999; Chua, 2003). The link to pigs in this outbreak 64 
was obvious as 93% of the infected patients had contact with pigs (Parashar et al., 2000). If a 65 
NiV strain were to become human-adapted and infect communities in Southeast Asia where 66 
there are high human and pig densities and pigs are a primary export commodity, infection 67 
could rapidly spread and humanity could face its most devastating pandemic (Huynh et al., 68 
2007; Luby, 2013; Donaldson and Lucey, 2018). 69 
 70 
The role of pigs in the 1998/99 Nipah virus outbreak 71 
In September 1998, there was an outbreak of severe febrile encephalitis among pig farmers in 72 
the state of Perak, Malaysia, that was associated with a high mortality rate. A total of 265 cases 73 
of encephalitis, of which 105 resulted in death, were confirmed. These deaths were initially 74 
thought to be due to Japanese encephalitis (JE), an endemic disease in Malaysia. However, 75 
with most cases occurring in men who worked with pigs, the epidemiological characteristics 76 
of this disease were distinct from those of JE, where ~75% of cases occur in children aged 0-77 
14 years (Chua et al., 2000; Lam and Chua, 2002; Malhotra et al., 2015). The epidemiological 78 
link was from fruit bats infecting pigs that then served as amplifier hosts, resulting in 79 
transmission to humans through close contact (Daszak et al., 2013). As a result of movement 80 
of infected pigs and humans to other states in Malaysia, by February 1999 similar diseases 81 
were recognised in both pigs and humans in new outbreak areas (CDC, 1999). In the following 82 
month, there were 11 cases of respiratory illness and encephalitis amongst Singapore abattoir 83 
workers who had handled pigs imported from the outbreak areas in Malaysia (Paton et al., 84 
1999). Due to this, the importation of pigs from Malaysia ceased which in turn ended the 85 
outbreak in Singapore. The outbreak in Malaysia ended when 1.1 million pigs (45% of the 86 
country’s pig population) were culled from outbreak and surrounding areas (Enserink, 1999; 87 
Parashar et al., 2000). The NiV outbreak incurred significant economic costs and long-term 88 
damage to the Malaysian pig industry: US$582 million in direct costs and lost market revenue, 89 
including US$97 million in compensation to farmers for the 1.1 million pigs slaughtered and 90 
36,000 jobs lost (Dimmock et al., 2016). To this date, Malaysian pig farming is only permitted 91 
in “identified pig farming areas”. 92 
 93 
Nipah virus infection in pigs 94 
Pigs also suffered during the 1998/99 Malaysian outbreak, but this was only diagnosed as part 95 
of the investigation following the human cases. The severity of symptoms of NiV infection in 96 
pigs varied with age. In suckling pigs (less than 4 weeks old), mortality could be high (up to 97 
40%) and laboured breathing and muscle tremors were evident. In growing pigs (1 to 6 98 
months), an acute febrile (>39.9°C) illness was observed with respiratory signs ranging from 99 
increased or forced respiration to a harsh, loud non-productive cough, open mouth breathing 100 
and epistaxis (OIE, 2018a). In some cases these respiratory signs were accompanied by one or 101 
more of the following neurological signs: trembles, neuralgic twitches, muscle fasciculation, 102 
tetanic spasms, incoordination, rear leg weakness or partial paralysis. Pigs of this age had high 103 
morbidity and low mortality (<5%) (Aziz et al., 1999; Nor et al., 2000; OIE, 2018a). Some 104 
animals over 6 months of age died rapidly (within 24 hours) without signs of clinical disease. 105 
Respiratory signs were reported in adult pigs, as with younger animals, although these were 106 
less obvious (laboured breathing, bloody nasal discharge, increased salivation) and 107 
neurological signs included head pressing, bar biting, tetanic spasms and convulsions. First 108 
trimester abortions were also reported (Aziz et al., 1999; Nor et al., 2000; OIE, 2018a).  109 
In an experimental infection study, pigs were inoculated subcutaneously with a NiV isolate 110 
from the central nervous system of a fatally infected human patient. Infection elicited 111 
respiratory and neurological symptoms consistent with those observed in naturally infected 112 
Malaysian pigs, which included febrile illness, incoordination, mucosal nasal discharge and 113 
persistent cough (Middleton et al., 2002). Pigs inoculated orally with the same dose did not 114 
show clinical signs although they still shed virus. In a second study, piglets were inoculated 115 
oronasally with a human NiV isolate (Berhane et al., 2008). All infected animals showed a 116 
transient increase in body temperature between 4 and 12 days post-infection. Two of these 117 
animals developed transient respiratory signs, mild depression and a hunched stance. Both 118 
these studies concluded that NiV infection in pigs had no pathognomonic features i.e. the 119 
clinical signs observed were non-specific. This can make field diagnosis of NiV infection in 120 
pigs difficult, as observed in the outbreak in Malaysia (Nor et al., 2000; Chua, 2003). 121 
The name proposed for the disease caused by NiV infection of pigs was 'porcine respiratory 122 
and neurological syndrome' (also known as 'porcine respiratory and encephalitis syndrome'), 123 
or, in peninsular Malaysia, 'barking pig syndrome' (Nor et al., 2000). NiV infection was 124 
included as the sixth pig diseases notifiable to the OIE World Organisation for Animal Health 125 
(OIE, 2018b). The OIE approve diagnostics and recommends preventative and control 126 
measures for a range of transboundary livestock diseases.  127 
 128 
Current state of NiV vaccine development 129 
Despite the importance of NiV as an emerging disease with the potential for pandemic, no 130 
therapeutics or vaccines are approved for use in humans or livestock species. Due to the lethal 131 
nature of NiV infection, producing a safe, live attenuated vaccine with no potential for 132 
reversion is difficult. However, recombinant NiV mutants, attenuated in hamster and ferret 133 
models, have been shown to generate strong neutralising antibody responses (Yoneda et al., 134 
2010; Satterfield et al., 2015). More commonly, NiV vaccine approaches have focussed 135 
individual candidate antigens delivered as subunit vaccines or using viral vectors. The most 136 
studied vaccine candidate is the soluble form of the G protein (sG) from the related Hendra 137 
virus (HeV). HeV and the NiV Malaysia strain share between 68-92% amino acid homology 138 
between their proteins; with F and G proteins sharing 88% and 83% homology, respectively 139 
(Harcourt et al., 2000). Both F and G envelope glycoproteins are regarded as vaccine candidate 140 
antigens since they are the targets of NiV neutralising antibodies (Broder et al., 2013).  141 
An adjuvanted HeV sG protein subunit-based vaccine (Equivac® HeV, Zoetis) has been 142 
licensed in Australia to protect horses against HeV and to reduce the zoonotic risk to humans 143 
(Middleton et al., 2014). Equivac® HeV protects ferrets and African green monkeys (AGMs) 144 
after experimental challenge with NiV, as well as HeV (Pallister et al., 2011; Mire et al., 2014). 145 
Surprisingly, this vaccine failed to protect pigs from experimental NiV challenge (Pickering et 146 
al., 2016). Since the vaccine induced cross-neutralising antibodies but not measurable T cell 147 
responses, the authors concluded that both arms of the adaptive immune response may be 148 
required for protection against NiV and HeV. These studies also potentially highlight that 149 
adjuvants can have species specific effects and tailoring of adjuvants to the target species may 150 
be required or considered in the context of preclinical models. The experimental viral vectored 151 
vaccine candidates for NiV include vesicular stomatitis virus, rabies virus, canarypox virus 152 
(ALVAC strain), adeno-associated virus (AAV), measles virus, Newcastle disease virus 153 
(NDV) and Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (Satterfield et al., 2016). ALVAC expressing 154 
NiV G or F (ALVAC-G and ALVAC-F) was found to protect pigs against NiV challenge two 155 
weeks after the second immunisation (Weingartl et al., 2006). High titres of NiV neutralising 156 
antibodies were induced with the ALVAC-G vaccine, while despite the low levels of 157 
neutralising antibodies induced by the ALVAC-F; all vaccinated pigs were protected against 158 
virulent NiV challenge. Recombinant attenuated NDV expressing NiV glycoproteins have 159 
been shown to induce long lasting NiV-specific nAbs in pigs, with the vector expressing NiV 160 
G performing better than NiV F (Kong et al., 2012) However, no challenge was performed in 161 
this study and it remains to be determined whether these paramyxovirus-based vaccine 162 
candidates are efficacious. Compared to canarypox vectors, NDV-based vectors have a number 163 
of advantages including their high titre propagation in chicken eggs removing the requirement 164 
for cell culture (Weingartl et al., 2006; Kong et al., 2012). Despite these encouraging results 165 
and the continued threat posed by NiV, no vaccine candidate has progressed towards market 166 
for either pigs or humans. 167 
 168 
The development of a NiV vaccine for pigs 169 
The promising performance of experimental NiV and HeV vaccines in animal models and the 170 
licensure of Equivac® HeV, as a ‘One Health’ vaccine to safeguard animal and human health, 171 
strongly support the proposition that a safe and effective NiV vaccine may be developed for 172 
pigs to reduce the severe economic consequences of NiV outbreaks and the threat to public 173 
health. With partners, we have initiated a project that aims to develop such a vaccine. We are 174 
systematically analysing the immunogenicity and protective efficacy of three NiV vaccine 175 
candidates in pigs: (1) an adjuvanted NiV sG protein (orthologous to the Equivac® HeV 176 
vaccine), (2) NiV G protein delivered by a replication-deficient simian adenoviral vector 177 
(ChAdOx1 NiV G), and an adjuvanted, molecular clamp stabilised NiV F (mcsF) protein. 178 
ChAdOx1 is a multispecies vector with an established human and livestock safety profile 179 
(Dicks et al., 2012). ChAdOx1 offers the potential for both single dose efficacy and 180 
thermostabilisation (Dulal et al., 2016; Warimwe et al., 2016). The molecular clamp is a 181 
proprietary stabilisation domain that preserves the F protein in its native 'pre-fusion' form, 182 
which should enhance immunogenicity and thermostability. In depth analyses of T cell and 183 
antibody responses are being conducted to identify correlates of vaccine-induced protection. 184 
We will examine the durability of NiV-neutralising antibodies and other immune responses 185 
associated with protection, including a comparison of a single-shot vs. homologous prime-186 
boost immunisation regimes. In-contact animals will be introduced to assess transmission of 187 
challenge virus from vaccinates or unvaccinated control animals.  188 
The sporadic nature of NiV outbreaks means that the commercial development of NiV vaccines 189 
for use in pigs (other livestock or humans) is limited and animal health companies are of the 190 
opinion that NiV vaccines will have limited marketability. Our ongoing studies should help 191 
facilitate this by developing a safe and efficacious prototype NiV vaccine that is amenable to 192 
“surge production” and discrimination of infection in vaccinated animals (DIVA) capability. 193 
Subsequent development and licensure of this vaccine will require engagement with 194 
international, regional and national agencies and the creation of dependable markets via the 195 
establishment of NiV vaccine banks. The OIE World Fund manages vaccine banks and the 196 
delivery of vaccines for avian influenza, rabies, foot-and-mouth disease and peste de petit 197 
ruminants (OIE, 2018c). Vaccine banks ensure the procurement and delivery of high quality 198 
vaccines mass-produced in line with OIE intergovernmental standards. Critically these vaccine 199 
banks can be rapidly deployed when required and this model appears most appropriate in the 200 
context of reactive emergency vaccination programmes to aid NiV outbreak control. Vaccines 201 
can play a major component in an emergency response against emerging infectious disease, 202 
with the main aim to reduce virus spread between susceptible hosts (Nii-Trebi, 2017). The 203 
precise decisions on control strategies will be complex and vary for different regions. Factors 204 
such as: herd density, production systems, the presence of susceptible wildlife, the impact on 205 
export trade and current opinions on economic versus ethical factors will likely play a role. 206 
One strategy to halt a NiV outbreak would be to deploy a stockpiled vaccine for ring 207 
vaccination around the NiV affected area. This approach was utilised in the 2016 Ebola 208 
outbreak in Guinea and showed great promise in terms of disease containment and elimination 209 
(Henao-Restrepo et al., 2015). For such a strategy, a vaccine with single-dose efficacy and a 210 
rapid onset of immunity preventing virus transmission would be preferential. This is likely to 211 
be best achieved with a viral-vectored (Warimwe et al., 2016) or mRNA vectored vaccine 212 
(Pardi et al., 2017). The highly unpredictable nature of NiV outbreaks means that it is highly 213 
unlikely that NiV vaccines would be used routinely by pig producers. One strategy that could 214 
help ensure that immunity to NiV is maintained in pig herds could involve the engineering of 215 
NiV G into a live attenuated viral vaccine, such as pseudorabies, which are widely used in 216 
countries at-risk.  217 
 218 
The pig as a model for human NiV  219 
The recent Ebola and Zika epidemics highlighted how poorly prepared we were to deal with 220 
these new and emerging diseases. There has therefore been a global drive to develop vaccines 221 
against these diseases and improve preparedness. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness 222 
Innovation’s (CEPI's) was established in 2016 with a mandate of financing and coordinating 223 
the development of new human vaccines to prevent and contain infectious disease epidemics. 224 
CEPI selected NiV, Lassa virus and Middle East respiratory syndrome-coronavirus, three 225 
pathogens from the WHO’s list of priority diseases needing urgent R&D attention as its initial 226 
focus (CEPI, 2018; WHO, 2018b). The WHO’s list of priority diseases is part of the R&D 227 
Blueprint, which identifies priority diseases and addresses gaps in the global scientific 228 
community to increase preparedness for future outbreaks. The main aim of the Blueprint is to 229 
fast-track the availability of effective tests, vaccines and medicines that can be used to save 230 
lives and avert large scale crises (WHO, 2018b).  231 
In 2002, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) established the ‘Animal Rule’ for 232 
regulatory approval of vaccines and therapeutics for which efficacy testing in humans is 233 
impossible, therefore requiring relevant animal models that represent a disease model similar 234 
to that of the human disease (FDA, 2002). Vaccine efficacy studies in animal models aim to 235 
identify specific vaccine-induced correlates of protection including neutralizing antibodies or 236 
cell-mediated responses (Meyer et al., 2018). In 2015, a vaccine to protect against anthrax was 237 
the first to be approved through the ‘animal rule’ (Beasley et al., 2016). The licensing pathway 238 
for the ‘Animal Rule’ requires that immunogenicity results from clinical trials must be 239 
consistent with previously identified immune correlates associated with protection (FDA, 240 
2002). Therefore, identifying reliable markers of vaccine-generated immunity becomes 241 
critically important for pathogens such as NiV. Large animal models have been shown to more 242 
accurately predict vaccine outcome in humans in comparison to small animal models (Gerdts 243 
et al., 2015) therefore defining correlates of vaccine-induced protection in pigs, may play an 244 
important role in supporting subsequent human vaccine licensure under the ‘Animal Rule’.  245 
Animal models can be validated for a particular disease according to a number of different 246 
criteria, which include ‘face’ and ‘predictive’ validity. For face validity there must be 247 
similarities in the pathology and clinical symptoms between the animal model and the human 248 
disease (Denayer et al., 2014). As discussed above, NiV infection of pigs causes a similar 249 
respiratory and neurological syndrome as seen in human infections. Although, disease severity 250 
in pigs may be considered lower than in humans. The predictive validity of a model means that 251 
clinically effective interventions demonstrate a similar effect in the animal model (Denayer et 252 
al., 2014). No clinical trials of NiV vaccine candidates have been reported to compare with 253 
vaccine performance in animal models, including the pig. As noted above, the success of the 254 
Equivac® HeV vaccine in horses and other animal models was not replicated in swine (Mire et 255 
al., 2014; Pickering et al., 2016), highlighting a potential issue of predicative validity when 256 
comparing NiV vaccines between animal species, which may extend to humans. On the other 257 
hand, pigs have been used successfully as models to study many human infectious diseases 258 
(Svedman et al., 1989; He et al., 1992; Nedrud, 1999; Elahi et al., 2007; Luna et al., 2009; 259 
Khatri et al., 2010; Meurens et al., 2012), including NiV infection (Weingartl et al., 2009).  260 
There is also a growing appreciation that pigs provide a superior animal model for influenza A 261 
virus infection and immunity and should play a more prominent role as a model for human 262 
influenza vaccine development (Rajao and Vincent, 2015). The success of the pig as an 263 
experimental animal model is partly due to their similarities with humans in terms of anatomy, 264 
immunology, and physiology, but also due to their manageable behavior and size, and by the 265 
general ethical acceptance of using pigs for experimental purposes instead of non-human 266 
primates (Meurens et al., 2012; Gerdts et al., 2015; Käser et al., 2018). 267 
 268 
Conclusions 269 
The NiV outbreaks in Malaysia and Singapore demonstrated that pigs can play a key role in 270 
the epidemiology of NiV by acting as an amplifier host. The region most at risk of NiV 271 
infection has some of the highest pig population densities found anywhere in the world, which 272 
are rising fast due to the demand of a growing human population. This increases the risk of 273 
NiV transmission to pigs and humans. The development of a NiV vaccine for use in pig 274 
populations would decrease the major risk NiV poses to the developing pig industries, as well 275 
as to the livelihoods of poor livestock keepers in Southeast Asia. The use of non-human animal 276 
models is crucial for vaccine development against diseases such as NiV since efficacy testing 277 
in humans is impossible. The pig model may therefore contribute to human vaccine 278 
development, supporting human vaccine licensure under the Animal Rule. 279 
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Figure 1. Previous outbreak locations of Henipavirus infection outbreaks. Nipah and 498 
Hendra virus distribution map highlighting the range of the natural wildlife reservoir, Pteropus 499 
spp. bats (adapted from CDC (2014)). 500 
